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Abstract 
 
The signcryption is a relatively new cryptographic 
technique that is supposed to fulfill the functionalities 
of encryption and digital signature in a single logical 
step. Several signcryption schemes are proposed 
throughout the years, each of them having its own 
problems and limitations. In this paper, the security of 
a recent signcryption scheme, i.e. Hwang et al.'s 
scheme is analyzed, and it is proved that it involves 
several security flaws and shortcomings. Several 
devastating attacks are also introduced to the 
mentioned scheme whereby it fails all the desired and 
essential security attributes of a signcryption scheme. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The encryption and digital signature are two 
fundamental cryptographic tools that can guarantee the 
unforgeability, integrity, and confidentiality of 
communications. Until the before decade, they have 
been viewed as important but distinct building blocks 
of various cryptographic systems. In public key 
schemes, a traditional method is to digitally sign a 
message then followed by an encryption (signature-
then-encryption) that can have two problems: Low 
efficiency and high cost of such summation, and the 
case that any arbitrary scheme cannot guarantee the 
security. The signcryption is a relatively new 
cryptographic technique that is supposed to fulfill the 
functionalities of digital signature and encryption in a 
single logical step and can effectively decrease the 
computational costs and communication overheads in 
comparison with the traditional signature-then-
encryption schemes. The first signcryption scheme was 
introduced by Zheng in 1997 [1] but it fails the 
forward secrecy of message confidentiality [2]. Zheng 
also proposed an elliptic curve-based signcryption 
scheme that saves 58% of computational and 40% of 
communication costs when it is compared with the 
traditional elliptic curve-based signature-then-
encryption schemes [3]. There are also many other 
signcryption schemes that are proposed throughout the 
years, each of them having its own problems and 
limitations, while they are offering different level of 
security services and computational costs. 
 In a signcryption scheme, the sender usually uses 
the public key of recipient for deriving a session key of 
a symmetric encryption, while the recipient uses his 
private key for deriving the same session key. 
Exposure of session keys can be a devastating attack to 
a cryptosystem since such an attack typically implies 
that all the security guarantees are lost. In this paper, 
we show that a recent signcryption scheme, i.e. Hwang 
et al.'s scheme [4] have such vulnerability and many 
other security flaws and shortcomings that are 
described throughout the paper. For the case of 
brevity, in this paper we refer to Hwang et al.'s scheme 
[4] as HLS. This paper is organized as follows. Section 
2 briefly presents some preliminaries on signcryption 
and its desired attributes. Section 3 is devoted to 
security analysis of the HLS signcryption scheme, and 
Section 4 provides the conclusions. 
 
 
2. Preliminaries on signcryption 
 
A signcryption scheme ),,( USCSCGen  typically 
consists of three algorithms: Key Generation (Gen), 
Signcryption (SC), and Unsigncryption (USC). Gen 
generates a pair of keys for any user U: 
),(),( UGenVEKSDK UU   where λ is the security 
parameter, USDK  is the private signing/decryption 
key of user U, and UVEK  is his public 
verification/encryption key. For any message ,Mm  
the signcrypted text   is obtained as 
),,( RS VEKSDKmSC  where S denotes the sender, 
and R is the recipient. SC is generally a probabilistic 
algorithm while USC is most likely to be deterministic 
where ),,(}{ SR VEKSDKUSCm   in which   
denotes the invalid result of unsigncryption. A formal 
proof for the security of signcryption is provided in 
[5]. Any signcryption scheme should have the 
following properties: 
1) Correctness: A signcryption scheme is correct only 
if for any sender S, recipient R, and message ,Mm  
mVEKSDKVEKSDKmSCUSC SRRS  ),),,,(( . 
2) Efficiency: The computational costs and 
communication overheads of a signcryption scheme 
should be smaller than those of the best known 
signature-then-encryption schemes with the same 
provided functionalities. 
3) Security: A signcryption scheme should 
simultaneously fulfill the security attributes of an 
encryption scheme and those of a digital signature. 
Such additional properties mainly include: 
Confidentiality, Unforgeability, Integrity, and Non-
repudiation. Some signcryption schemes provide 
further attributes such as Public verifiability and 
Forward secrecy of message confidentiality while the 
others do not provide them. Such properties are the 
attributes that are required in many applications while 
the others may not require them. Hereunder, the above-
mentioned attributes are briefly described. 
 Confidentiality: It should be computationally 
infeasible for an adaptive attacker to gain any 
partial information on the contents of a signcrypted 
text, without knowledge of the sender's or 
designated recipient's private key. 
 Unforgeability: It should be computationally 
infeasible for an adaptive attacker to masquerade an 
honest sender in creating an authentic signcrypted 
text that can be accepted by the unsigncryption 
algorithm. 
 Non-repudiation: The recipient should have the 
ability to prove to a third party (e.g. a judge) that 
the sender has sent the signcrypted text. This 
ensures that the sender cannot deny his previously 
signcrypted texts. 
 Integrity: The recipient should be able to verify that 
the received message is the original one that was 
sent by the sender. 
 Public Verifiability: Any third party without any 
need for the private key of sender or recipient can 
verify that the signcrypted text is the valid 
signcryption of its corresponding message.  
 Forward Secrecy of message confidentiality: If the 
long-term private key of the sender is compromised, 
no one should be able to extract the plaintext of 
previously signcrypted texts. In a regular 
signcryption scheme, when the long-term private 
key is compromised, all the previously issued 
signatures will not be trustworthy any more. Since 
the threat of key exposure is becoming more acute 
as the cryptographic computations are performed 
more frequently on poorly protected devices such as 
mobile phones, the forward secrecy seems an 
essential attribute in such systems.  
 
 Many of the proposed signcryption schemes include 
modular exponentiation while some of them are based 
on elliptic curves. The elliptic curve-based solutions 
are usually based on difficulty of Elliptic Curve 
Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) that is 
computationally infeasible under certain circumstances 
[6]. The elliptic curve-based systems can attain to a 
desired security level with significantly smaller keys 
than that of required by their exponential-based 
counterparts. As an example, it is believed that a 160-
bit key in an elliptic curve-based system provides the 
same level of security as that of a 1024-bit key in an 
RSA-based system [6]. This can enhance the speed and 
leads to efficient use of power, bandwidth, and storage 
that are the basic limitations of resource restricted 
devices. Throughout this paper, Alice is the sender or 
the initiator of the protocol, Bob is the designated 
recipient, and Mallory is the malicious active attacker. 
 
3. Cryptanalysis of the HLS Signcryption 
Scheme  
 
A schema of the HLS signcryption scheme [4] is 
depicted in Figure 1 where the deployed notations are 
described in Figure 2. The public keys of Alice and 
Bob in HLS are generated as GdU AA   and 
GdU BB  . The HLS claims to provide the attributes 
of confidentiality, unforgeability, integrity, public 
verifiability, and forward secrecy of message 
confidentiality. However, as we prove in this section, it  
 
Figure 1. Hwang et al.'s Signcryption Scheme 
(HLS) [4] 
 
 
Figure 2. Deployed notations 
 
has several security flaws so that it fails all the desired 
and essential security attributes of a signcryption 
scheme. 
 
1) The security of HLS completely depends on the 
secrecy of random number r. It does not have any 
resilience to disclosure of such ephemeral parameter, 
and the long-term private key of initiator (Alice) will 
be simply divulged with disclosure of r. The point R is 
obtained as rGR  , and it is clearly sent to Bob. It 
does not differ for the users that have selected the same 
value of r. If Mallory knows the corresponding r of R, 
he can easily deduce the static private key of Alice 
from an intercepted pair of ),,( sRC . He calculates 
),( KKB yxrUK  , finds the secret key of 
encryption ( Kxk  ), decrypts the ciphertext as 
)(CDM k , and calculates )||( RxMHh  . He then 
simply deduces the long-term private key of Alice as 
nhrsd A mod)(  . Therefore, the confidentiality, 
unforgeability, non-repudiation, and other claimed 
security attributes of the HLS completely depend on 
the secrecy of r and will be completely failed with its 
disclosure. This attack is feasible due to the weakness 
in session key derivation function of the HLS.  
Although it is believed that finding the 
corresponding r of R is in deposit of solving the 
ECDLP, there are some practical circumstances where 
this is not the case. Hereunder, we describe two 
practical situations in which the adversary can find the 
corresponding r of some R without solving the 
ECDLP. The first feasibility is that many applications 
may boost their performance by pre-computing the 
ephemeral pairs of (r, R) for their later uses. This may 
be applied to low-power devices as well as high 
volume servers. In this case, the stored pairs are more 
vulnerable to leakage than the long-term private keys. 
The latter may be stored on a hardware protected 
storage media while the former is typically stored on 
disks and hence is exposed to more vulnerability. If an 
adversary could have any access to such stored pairs, 
he can easily deduce the long-term private key of the 
sender by following the above-mentioned approach. 
The second feasibility is to misuse the possible 
weaknesses of the deployed random number 
generators. The generated random numbers are 
actually pseudo-random and may have some biases, 
especially when they are generated in resource 
restricted devices. Mallory runs the deployed random 
number generator of his victims, produces the most 
probable pairs of (r, R), and saves them offline. He 
then intercepts the Bob's terminal that would have 
many transactions everyday. He observes the clearly 
sent R in the intercepted messages and picks those 
messages that he has their R in his compiled list. He 
simply deduces the long-term private keys of the 
corresponding senders from such chosen signcrypted 
texts by following the previously stated method. This 
can be considered as a chosen-ciphertext attack. He 
uses the deduced private keys for impersonating 
himself as the legitimate users and performing his 
malicious activities. Although r is randomly selected, it 
is feasible that some users produce the same random 
number at the same time so Mallory can easily deduce 
the long-term private keys of all the senders that have 
the same value of R in their signcrypted texts provided 
that he knows the corresponding r of that R. If Mallory 
aims a definite entity, he may wait until his victim 
sends an R that he has it in his compiled list. Until 
then, Mallory can make his list richer.  
Although the mentioned attack works for awkward 
implementations of the HLS, it is completely regarded 
to its weak session key derivation function that 
includes a simple elliptic curve point multiplication 
and taking the x-coordinate of the product as the 
session key. 
 
2) Although HLS considers verifying public keys 
using the certificates, the certificate validation is not 
considered itself. The process of certificate validation 
includes [7]: 
(a) Verifying the integrity and authenticity of the 
certificate by verifying the CA's signature on the 
certificate. 
(b) Verifying that the certificate is not expired. 
(c) Verifying that the certificate is not revoked. 
Without a certificate validation, the certificates and 
public keys can be easily forged. 
 
3) HLS does not consider the public key validation so 
it is feasible to get certificates for the invalid public 
keys. An invalid public key is of a small order resided 
on an invalid-curve, and can be misused for an invalid-
curve attack [6, 8]. The selected elliptic curve of HLS 
has the Weierstrass equation of the form 
baxxy  32  defined over the finite field qF  so its 
corresponding invalid-curve has the form of 
baxxy  32 . The public key of user U, 
),(
UU UUU yxU   is valid if all the following 
conditions are simultaneously satisfied [8]: 
(a) OUU  . 
(b) 
UUx and UUy should have the proper format of 
qF elements. 
(c) UU  should satisfy the defining equation of E. 
 Traditionally, the public key validation is not 
considered in the PKI standards (such as [9] and [10]), 
and the Certificate Authority (CA) just performs a 
proof of possession by checking the user's signature 
over a message of a predetermined format so it is 
feasible to get a certificate for an invalid public key if 
the public key validation is not considered. Antipa et 
al. [8] demonstrated how to get a certificate for an 
invalid public key when CA uses the ECDSA for its 
digital signatures. In the HLS, CA does not verify 
whether each entity really possesses the corresponding 
private key of its claimed public key or not. Such 
shortcoming exposes it to the mentioned vulnerability. 
 
4) The delivery confirmation or a receipt from the 
recipient is necessary for some applications. Although 
HLS is one-pass, the implementer may add a 
confirmation step in which Bob sends Alice a 
confirmation message perhaps in addition to a Message 
Authentication Code (MAC) in which the session key 
of encryption is used as the key. Since the validity 
verification of ephemeral public key (point R) is not 
included in unsigncryption phase of the HLS, it can be 
misused for an invalid-curve attack [8] whereby Alice 
is capable of deducing the long-term private key of 
Bob. Here is how the attack works [8]. Alice chooses 
an invalid-curve containing a point iW  of small order 
ig . She uses iW  instead of R, proceeds the 
signcryption, and sends ),,( sCWi  to Bob. In the 
unsigncryption, Bob computes ),( KKiB yxWdK  , 
and proceeds the unsigncryption. Finally, when Bob 
sends the confirmation message M' and its 
corresponding tag )(MMACz
Kx
  to Alice, she can 
easily determine a point  iWK  satisfying 
)(MMACz
Kx
   due to the small order of her chosen 
iW  point. Hence, Alice can find 
22
Bgg
dd
i
i
  with 2ig  
number of trials. Alice selects other iW  points of 
different orders ig , and repeats the above-mentioned 
attack. The order of such chosen iW  points should be 
relatively prime, i.e. we should have 
jigg ji  ,1),gcd( . Such points can be selected 
from different invalid-curves. Each round of attack 
gives 22 Bgg
dd
i
i
 . Ultimately, Alice finds the private 
key of Bob using the Chinese Remainder Theorem 
(CRT) [7] while Bob is unaware that such an attack is 
taking place. 
 
5) The HLS is vulnerable to the Unknown Key-Share 
(UKS) attack. In an UKS attack, two parties compute 
the same session key but have different views of their 
peers in the key exchange. In an UKS attack, an 
adversary interferes with the Alice's and Bob's 
communication so that Alice correctly believes that her 
session key is shared with Bob while Bob mistakenly 
believes that the session key is shared with another 
entity. This can be accomplished whenever Mallory 
can convince one of the honest parties that he has the 
knowledge of the session key. Further issues on the 
practical attack scenarios and significance of the UKS 
attack are provided in [11]. The UKS attack is feasible 
when a key exchange protocol fails to provide an 
authenticated binding between the session key and 
identifiers of the honest entities. Since the private key 
and identifier of Alice is not involved in the session 
key derivation function of the HLS, it does not have 
any resilience to the UKS attack. 
 
6) The HLS does not really have its claimed attribute 
of forward secrecy of message confidentiality. The 
outsider and insider security are two notions of 
security that are usually considered in signcryption 
schemes. While the outsider security assumes that the 
adversary is neither sender nor the recipient, the 
insider security allows an adversary to be sender or 
recipient. The forward secrecy of message 
confidentiality is an attribute that is provided through 
the insider security. HLS claims to have such an 
attribute because its message confidentiality relies on 
two secret factors: the long-term private key of Alice 
( Ad ), and the ephemeral random number r. However, 
anyone who has Bd  can simply recover the 
signcrypted text and deduce the corresponding random 
number r as nhsdr A mod)(
1 . When Ad  is 
revealed, Mallory who could obtain Ad , may also 
request Bob to compute the corresponding r for him so 
he can simply recover the signcrypted text without any 
need for the knowledge of Bd . Regardless of its 
practical benefits, this invalidates the definition of 
forward secrecy of message confidentiality.  
 
7) There is not any provision for the key control in the 
HLS so the plaintext may be encrypted with a weak or 
even a full-zero key. There is also no checking for 
OK  . 
 
8) Domain parameters of the HLS are not exactly 
selected. Practically, there are other considerations that 
should be taken into account when selecting the 
domain parameters in order to thwart several potential 
attacks to elliptic curves. Such requirements are not 
considered in domain parameters of the HLS, and can 
make it vulnerable to several kinds of attacks if the 
implementer unconsciously selects the domain 
parameters in the range of such non-stated conditions. 
In order to thwart the small subgroup attacks [6], the 
point G should be of a prime order n and we should 
have qn 4  [12]. The condition qn 4  that is not 
considered in the HLS, can make it vulnerable to small 
subgroup attacks. Furthermore, to protect against other 
known attacks on special classes of elliptic curves, n 
should not divide 1iq  for some integer i, qn   
should be satisfied, and the curve should be non-
supersingular [12]. Such considerations are not also 
considered in specifications of the HLS's domain 
parameters. 
 
9) The zero value is not excluded from the variation 
range of r. There is also no checking for OR   in 
signcryption phase of the HLS. The signature 
generation function is not well-designed so if 0r  
occurs, the clearly sent digital signature exhibits the 
long-term private key of Alice ( Ads  ). 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The security of Hwang et al.'s signcryption scheme 
(HLS) [4] is evaluated in this paper, and it is proved 
that it involves several security flaws and shortcomings 
as it fails all the desired and essential security 
attributes of a signcryption scheme. As it is illustrated 
in this paper, one of the most important security 
vulnerabilities of the HLS is due to its weak session 
key establishment that can lead to disclosure of long-
term private key of the initiator, and the case that it 
does not consider many essential considerations such 
as validity verification of static and ephemeral public 
keys and certificates. There are also other 
shortcomings that were explained throughout the 
paper.  
 
References 
 
[1] Y. Zheng, “Digital signcryption or how to achieve Cost 
(Signature & Encryption) << Cost (Signature) + Cost 
(Encryption),” Advances in Cryptology–CRYPTO'97, 
LNCS 1294, pp.165-179, Springer-Verlag, 1997. 
[2] H.Y. Jung, K.S. Chang, D.H. Lee, and J.I. Lim, 
“Signcryption schemes with forward secrecy,” 
Proceeding of Information Security Application-WISA 
2001, pp.403-475, 2001. 
[3] Y. Zheng, and H. Imai, “How to construct efficient 
signcryption schemes on elliptic curves,” Information 
Processing Letters, Vol.68, pp.227-233, Elsevier Inc., 
1998. 
[4] R.-J. Hwang, C.-H. Lai, and F.-F. Su, “An efficient 
signcryption scheme with forward secrecy based on 
elliptic curve,” Journal of Applied Mathematics and 
Computation, Vol.167, No.2, pp.870-881, Elsevier Inc., 
2005. 
[5] J. Baek, R. Steinfeld, Y. Zheng, “Formal Proofs for the 
Security of Signcryption,” Journal of Cryptology, 
Vol.20, pp.203-235, 2007.  
[6] D. Hankerson, A. Menezes, and Scott Vanstone, 
“Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography,” Springer-
Verlag, New York, 2004. 
[7] D.R. Stinson, “Cryptography-Theory and Practice,” 3rd 
edition, Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2006. 
[8] A. Antipa, D. Brown, A. Menezes, R. Struik, and S. 
Vanstone, “Validation of elliptic curve public keys,” 
Advances in Cryptology–PKC'03, LNCS 2567, pp.211-
223, Springer-Verlag, 2003. 
[9] C. Adams, and S. Farrell, “Internet X.509 Public Key 
Infrastructure: Certificate Management Protocols,” 
RFC 2510, March 1999. Available at: 
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2510.txt 
[10] M. Myers, C. Adams, D. Solo, and D. Kemp, “Internet 
X.509 Certificate Request Message Format,” RFC 
2511, March 1999. Available at: 
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2511.txt 
[11] S. Blake-Wilson, and A. Menezes, “Unknown Key-
Share Attacks on the Station-to-Station (STS) 
Protocol”, Advances in Cryptology–PKC’99, LNCS 
1560, pp.154-170, Springer-Verlag, 1999. 
[12] M. Toorani, and A.A. Beheshti Shirazi, “SSMS - A 
Secure SMS Messaging Protocol for the M-Payment 
Systems”, Proceedings of the 13th IEEE Symposium on 
Computers and Communications (ISCC'08), pp.700-
705, Marrakech, Morocco, July 2008.  
